Security
Most vendors ask you to believe a policy. CLS++ is arranged so the question doesn't arise: our servers hold ciphertext and no key that can open it. Below are the answers your security review will ask for.
Security questionnaire
No. Content is encrypted on the device under ZPML — a composition of FHIPE, Paillier and additive secret sharing — before any network call. We operate on ciphertext, including for search. There is no internal tool, break-glass path or support process that returns plaintext.
You do. Key material is derived and held client-side. Enterprise deployments can bind custody to your own KMS or HSM, so revoking our access is a change you make, not a request you file.
An attacker with full access to our storage obtains encrypted records and metadata. That is the design intent — the blast radius of a CLS++ compromise is deliberately bounded to what ciphertext discloses.
Where you pin it. Records are written to a nominated region and do not leave it. Residency is evidenced in the export, which matters for RBI, SEBI, IRDAI, Indonesia's PDP and EU transfer assessments.
Entries are hash-chained and append-only. Any deletion or edit breaks the chain and is visible in the integrity view. Deletion requests are recorded as tombstones rather than silent removals, so the record of the deletion survives.
Encrypted retrieval runs under 50 ms cross-region. Capture is asynchronous and does not sit in the path of the model response, so users see no added latency in the tools they use.
The ZPML construction is the subject of a provisional patent filed in 2026. The architecture brief, threat model and cryptographic design notes are available under NDA for security review, along with current certification status.
Design commitments